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THE MOLD THAT SHAPES HEARSAY LAW 
Richard D. Friedman∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In response to an article previously published in the Florida Law 
Review by Professor Ben Trachtenberg, I argue that the historical thesis 
of Crawford v. Washington is basically correct: The Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment reflects a principle about how 
witnesses should give testimony, and it does not create any broader 
constraint on the use of hearsay. I argue that this is an appropriate limit 
on the Clause, and that in fact for the most part there is no good reason 
to exclude nontestimonial hearsay if live testimony by the declarant to 
the same proposition would be admissible. I further suggest that the 
prevailing law of evidence is consistent with this approach to a 
significant degree, because the doctrine is much more receptive to 
nontestimonial hearsay than to testimonial hearsay. In contrast to 
Professor Trachtenberg, I am not troubled by the fact that this approach 
would probably not block admissibility of one of the notable statements 
in the trial of Walter Raleigh, or by the fact that the approach supports 
the willingness of some courts to admit evidence of statements made in 
support of lawful joint ventures. I conclude by offering some 
suggestions as to how hearsay doctrine might be transformed to reflect 
the principles advocated in this Essay. 
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A decade ago, in Crawford v. Washington,1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not 
create a substantive standard of reliability by which the admissibility of 
hearsay is to be assessed.2 Rather, it provides a categorical procedural 
rule that, with only rather narrow qualifications, bars use of a 
testimonial statement against an accused, unless the accused has had an 
opportunity (at trial, if reasonably possible) to be confronted with the 
witness who made the statement.3 
When Crawford came down, I thought that the categorical treatment 
of testimonial statements reflected such an obvious core principle of our 
criminal justice system that I hoped lower courts and prosecutors would 
soon come to accept it and the Supreme Court itself would adhere to it 
steadfastly. I should have known better. 
But I really thought I was safe in assuming that those on the defense 
side would recognize that the impact of Crawford has obviously been to 
fortify the confrontation right. And of course many do. But Professor 
Ben Trachtenberg, in an article published in this Review,4 focuses on 
the fact that the Crawford doctrine narrows the theoretical scope of the 
Confrontation Clause, so that it applies only to testimonial statements 
rather than—as under the prior regime—all hearsay statements.5 He is 
troubled by this fact. I am not. 
 
I will make the following main points in this Essay: 
 
1. However much one may quibble about details, the basic 
historical thesis of Crawford is correct: The confrontation right, as 
stated in the Sixth Amendment and recognized over centuries in the 
common law system, reflects a principle about how witnesses should 
give testimony—under oath, face-to-face with the adverse party, and 
subject to cross-examination. It does not express a rule about the 
admissibility of hearsay in general. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 67–69. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Ben Trachtenberg, Confronting Coventurers: Conspirator Hearsay, Sir Walter 
Raleigh, and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1669 (2012). 
 5. Id. at 1672–73. 
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2. It is perfectly appropriate to limit the Confrontation Clause to 
a rule about testimony, with other doctrines providing for exclusion on 
other grounds. 
 
3. For the most part, if hearsay is nontestimonial and live 
testimony of the declarant to the same proposition would be admissible, 
there is no good reason that justifies exclusion of the hearsay.  
 
4. This approach helps explain many of the exemptions to the 
hearsay rule, including the exemption for statements by a conspirator of 
the accused.6 It also helps explain a long-term trend in the American 
judicial system to be more receptive to nontestimonial hearsay. Thus, to 
a great extent the confrontation principle is the mold that shapes hearsay 
law. The mold of a bronze statue shapes the statue by setting limits on 
where the molten metal can go; similarly, the confrontation principle 
sets limits on the types of statements to which hearsay exemptions 
might apply.  
 
5. Under this approach, the confrontation right would 
presumably not block admission of one of the notable statements in the 
case of Sir Walter Raleigh. But that fact does not undermine the merits 
of the approach, and neither does the fact that the approach supports the 
willingness of some courts to admit evidence of statements made in 
support of “lawful joint ventures.” 
 
6. Black-letter law effectively creates a presumption that hearsay 
is inadmissible. The law would be improved by reversing that 
presumption with respect to probative nontestimonial hearsay. That is, 
courts and rulemakers should treat such hearsay as inadmissible only for 
good cause, such as the proponent’s superior ability to produce the 
declarant as a live witness at trial. 
I.  HISTORY 
An originalist like Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the majority 
opinion in Crawford, seeks to determine the public meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause as of the time of its adoption in 1791. I believe 
that history offers a deeper lesson concerning the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The Rule uses the term “co-conspirators,” and this is 
the common parlance. But James Joseph Duane, Some Thoughts on How the Hearsay Exception 
for Conspirators’ Statements Should—and Should Not—Be Amended, 165 F.R.D. 299, 304–12 
(1996), argues at some length that we should speak instead of a party's conspirators. If someone 
puts so much energy, learning, and rhetoric into such a trivial point he may well be right, and 
largely for that reason I have made a habit of adhering to Professor Duane’s locution. 
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confrontation right, for the right reflects a principle that has been central 
to the common law system, among others, for centuries.7 
The essential idea of the right is actually very simple: A rational 
system of adjudication must depend, in large part, on information 
provided by witnesses. Given this premise, the system must decide the 
procedure by which the witnesses provide that information—that is, by 
which they testify. A common requirement is that testimony be given 
under oath or some similar form of solemnification.8 Beyond that, 
various procedures for giving testimony are possible. For example, one 
could, as the ancient Athenians did, require that witnesses provide their 
testimony in writing and under seal.9 Or one could require, as the old 
courts of continental Europe did, that witnesses testify before officials 
and out of the presence of the parties.10 But for centuries, one of the 
great prides of the English was that in their system, as in those of the 
ancient Hebrews and Romans, witnesses against an accused gave their 
testimony openly, “face-to-face” with the accused.11 As the system 
developed further, it also became clear that the accused had a right to 
subject the witnesses against him to cross-examination.12 And although 
the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses was usually provided 
at trial, a well-developed body of law allowed the prosecution to use 
prior testimony of the witness if she was unavailable at trial and the 
accused had had an opportunity to be confronted by her.13 Although the 
English did not honor the right of confrontation without fail, it was a 
clearly established norm that migrated to America.14 The new states 
incorporated it in their constitutions, and it was included in the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.15 
This history all seems very clear. Indeed, I do not know of anybody 
who denies any part of this account. Certainly Professor Trachtenberg 
does not. And the account I have just given is, in essence, the same as 
that offered in Crawford.16 So then why is there any historical debate 
about the confrontation right? The answer, I believe, is hinted at in this 
                                                                                                                     
 7. The summary presented here draws from the fuller account in Richard D. Friedman & 
Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1201–09 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 1209. 
 9. WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS, A DAY IN OLD ATHENS: A PICTURE OF ATHENIAN LIFE 137 
(1960) (“All pertinent testimony is now written down, and the tablets sealed up by the 
magistrate.”). 
 10.  Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1202–03 & n.111. 
 11.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES 
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)). 
 12. See, e.g., King v. Paine (1696), 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.) 585; 5 Mod. 163, 165; 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–46. 
 13. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1204 n.19. 
 14. Id. at 1204–05, 1206–09; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 15. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1206–09. 
 16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50. 
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passage written by Professor Trachtenberg: 
[H]earsay law remained largely unsettled at the time of 
ratification, making it difficult to believe that the authors 
and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment gave serious thought 
to the various classes of hearsay identified in modern 
blackletter evidence law.17 
I agree with Professor Trachtenberg that hearsay law was not well-
settled at the time the Confrontation Clause was ratified as part of the 
Sixth Amendment. Indeed, it had just begun to form.18 But the 
conclusion to be drawn from this is not that the authors and ratifiers of 
the Clause intended to require the exclusion of all hearsay, or of all 
hearsay not deemed by a court to be reliable. The Confrontation Clause 
was not an attempt to express a principle of hearsay law at all.19 Rather, 
it expressed a well-understood and long-established principle of how 
witnesses give their testimony.20 One way of demonstrating this is to 
examine Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise on evidence, initially published in 
the mid-eighteenth century and often considered the first real treatise on 
the subject. It includes very little discussion of hearsay. Although 
Gilbert said that hearsay was “no evidence,”21 he did not elaborate on 
what this meant. For example, he included no definition of hearsay—a 
matter of considerable complexity under modern law22—or any 
suggestion that the rule might be subject to an extensive set of 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1678. 
 18. Edmund Burke said in 1794, albeit with considerable exaggeration, that “it was true, 
something had been written on the Law of Evidence, but very general, very abstract, and 
comprised in so small a compass, that a parrot that he had known might get them by rote in one 
half-hour, and repeat them in five minutes.” HISTORY OF THE TRIAL OF WARREN HASTINGS, ESQ., 
84 (1796) (Feb. 25, 1794 entry). Professor Tom Gallanis has shown that “[u]ntil the 1780s, the 
courts rarely discussed the hearsay rule.” T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 499, 536 (1999). Gallanis argues that there was a burst of activity in the 1780s and 
that much of the structure of modern hearsay law was in place by 1800. Id. Even assuming he is 
right about the latter assertion—I have some doubts, because I know of no articulation of 
anything like the modern definition of hearsay before 1800—it does not suggest that those 
developments underlay the Confrontation Clause, for at least two reasons. First, the 
confrontation right was expressed in state constitutions before and shortly after 1780; it 
expressed a principle understood to be very old. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 
1206–11. Second, it is unlikely that such recent developments would have become known in 
America, and certainly not well enough absorbed to have formed a common basis of 
understanding of the meaning of proposed constitutional text. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the 
Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. 
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 153–62 (2005). 
 19. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1209. 
 20. Id. 
 21. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (1754). 
 22. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (expressing the basic definition of hearsay). 
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exemptions.23 And of course it certainly was not true that there was a 
general rule in practice barring everything that would come within the 
modern definition of hearsay; in fact, courts readily admitted a great 
deal of hearsay.24 Gilbert’s brief mention of hearsay was incorporated in 
a long chapter about witnesses,25 which included the procedure by 
which they should give their testimony.26 And, in a separate section, he 
discussed in considerable detail the law governing depositions.27 This 
sophisticated doctrine determined when a prior testimonial statement of 
a witness could be admitted at trial because the witness was unavailable. 
It is strikingly similar in substance to the modern hearsay exception for 
former testimony.28 But it was not then thought of as an exception to a 
rule against hearsay; rather, it was an alternative method by which a 
witness’s testimony could be offered if the adverse party had a chance 
to be confronted with the witness and the witness was unavailable.29 
What happened then? It appears that, as lawyers played a larger role 
in criminal trials, they demanded that they be able to cross-examine 
anybody whose out-of-court statement might be introduced against their 
clients to prove the truth of what it asserted; they did not restrict the 
demand to those whose statements were testimonial in nature.30 Indeed, 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, they pushed the doctrine so far 
that it included out-of-court conduct that did not assert the statement in 
question but appeared to reflect the actor’s belief in it.31 Such a broad 
rule of exclusion would be untenable if it were unqualified, and 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. 801(d) (exempting certain statements from the definition of hearsay), 803, 804, 
807 (providing exceptions to the rule against hearsay). 
 24. Compare Gallanis, supra note 18, at 512, 514–15 (“Hearsay, for example, occupies 
much of the modern law of evidence but in 1755 was accepted [in civil trials] almost without 
comment. . . . Hearsay went almost as unregulated [in criminal trials] as in civil trials. . . . Some 
notion thus existed of hearsay as an evidentiary problem, but the rules restricting it had not yet 
fully developed.”), and John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A 
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189–90 (1996) (noting that “it is hard 
to believe that the courts of the mid-eighteenth century enforced the hearsay rule,” that 
“[c]ounsel seem not to have objected to hearsay often,” and that “the courts seem to have 
received it aplenty,” and surmising “that the question of excluding hearsay and other suspect 
types of testimony may still have been remitted to judicial discretion, rather than being subject 
to firm rules of exclusion”), with Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1702 (saying hearsay was 
excluded by the common law since the seventeenth century). 
 25. GILBERT, supra note 21, at 86–104. 
 26. Id. at 94–104. 
 27. Id. at 44–51. 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 29. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1204 n.120. 
 30. See Gallanis, supra note 18, at 545–46. 
 31. See Wright v. Doe dem. Tatham (1838), 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.); 5 Cl. & F. 670. The 
reach of the rule as it was applied in Wright is suggested by the title of the classic article, Judson 
F. Falknor, The “Hear-Say” Rule as a “See-Do” Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. 
REV. 133, 134 (1961). 
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throughout the rest of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
principal movement was a loosening of the hearsay restraint by 
expanding the exemptions to the exclusionary rule.32 The result was a 
doctrine of great breadth but of questionable force—one that was 
marked by a jumble of exemptions supposedly justified by various 
assertions of cracker-barrel psychology. For example, if people are 
startled, they almost surely tell the truth, don’t they?33 And a person 
would not lie to her doctor about her condition, would she?34 The 
rationales underlying both the basic exclusionary rule and the 
exemptions were so unpersuasive that they made the doctrine seem of 
dubious value.35 And that welter of complexity tended to occlude the 
simple driving principle that lay at the heart of the hearsay rule—that 
when one gives testimony against a person, especially against a criminal 
defendant, she should do it in open court if reasonably possible, but in 
any event, under oath, subject to cross-examination, and face-to-face.  
Indeed, even after holding that the Confrontation Clause expresses a 
fundamental right that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates against 
the states,36 the Supreme Court seemed at a loss as to what the 
confrontation right actually means.37 After fifteen years, in Ohio v. 
Roberts,38 the Court finally adopted a theory of the Clause, based on the 
perception that it acts as a filter against unreliable evidence.39 Roberts 
virtually constitutionalized the law of hearsay: it provided on the one 
hand that the offer of any hearsay statement against an accused creates a 
presumptive confrontation problem, and on the other that the problem 
could be relieved by bringing the statement within a “firmly rooted 
hearsay exception.”40 Even if a statement did not fit within such an 
exception, Roberts indicated that it might yet avoid the confrontation 
bar if it was supported by “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness”41—a doctrine that rather closely resembled the residual 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is Happening—to the Confrontation 
Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 595 (2007) (“As the nineteenth century progressed, courts 
relaxed their attitudes somewhat toward hearsay evidence, to the point where they allowed 
several exceptions to the rule.”). 
 33. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 34. See id. 803(4). 
 35. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations of the Law of 
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437–39 (1928) (discussing criticism of the excited utterance 
exception). 
 36. Id. at 406. 
 37. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1980) (pointing out the Court’s struggle to 
“accommodate the[] competing interests” of the Confrontation Clause).  
 38. Id. at 56.  
 39. Id. at 65–66, 72.  
 40. Id. at 66. 
 41. Id. 
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exception to the rule against hearsay.42 It took nearly a quarter century 
more before the Court in Crawford rediscovered the essential nature of 
the confrontation right. 
II.  TEXT AND STRUCTURE 
It might help to look at the text of the Confrontation Clause in the 
context of the entire Sixth Amendment: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence [sic].43 
This certainly seems to be a set of rules about criminal procedure. 
And the Clause on which we are focusing seems to say quite clearly that 
the accused has a right to insist that those who testify against him be 
brought in his presence; it also seems obvious that included implicitly is 
at least the right to insist that those witnesses give their testimony in his 
presence (not just that the accused be able to see them at some time, 
though not necessarily when they testify). Furthermore, note that the 
Clause, like the rest of the Amendment, speaks in simple, categorical 
terms. A court does not have to weigh in the particular case whether the 
accused has a right to a public trial, or to the assistance of counsel; the 
text expressly says that “the accused shall enjoy” these rights “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions.” There may be ambiguity about what any of 
these rights mean, of course. How fast is speedy enough? What 
measures must be taken to determine if a jury is impartial? But the text 
clearly says that the rights, whatever their bounds, must be honored in 
every criminal case. For the Confrontation Clause, that means that a 
court must determine who “the witnesses against” the accused are, and 
then allow the accused “to be confronted with” them, whatever that 
means. The court is not free to say that in the particular case the right is 
not worth protecting. 
Given that the Clause insists on a prescribed procedure for 
testimony, it cannot be evaded by presenting evidence in court of 
testimony not satisfying that procedure. Suppose, for example, that, as 
in Crawford, a witness describes a crime to a police officer in the 
station house, knowing full well that the officer is gathering evidence 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See FED. R. EVID. 807(1). 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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for a criminal prosecution.44 Suppose further that, not for any reason 
attributable to conduct of the accused, the witness does not attend trial 
and that the prosecution attempts instead to introduce evidence of her 
statement—perhaps the police officer’s own testimony recounting the 
out-of-court witness’s statement, or perhaps some recorded form of the 
out-of-court statement, such as an affidavit in which the witness makes 
the statement or an audio or videotape of her making it. Plainly, such an 
evasion cannot be allowed, because doing so would effectively create a 
system in which a witness could testify out of court, without 
confrontation. And so the procedural requirement of the Confrontation 
Clause is necessarily enforced by means of an evidentiary rule of 
exclusion.  
But as the history indicates and the text confirms, the Confrontation 
Clause does not impose a substantive limit on evidence.45 That is, it 
does not prescribe that a piece of evidence is inadmissible because there 
is some defect in the evidence itself, as opposed to the procedure by 
which it was created, leading it to be insufficiently probative or 
excessively prejudicial.46  
It is therefore striking to me that Professor Trachtenberg speaks of 
the pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause as having “saved us” from 
admission of a class of evidence that he thinks should be excluded, and 
of the post-Crawford Clause as not doing so.47 The only thing the 
Confrontation Clause is supposed to “save” us from is a system in 
which witnesses testify without adhering to proper procedures. If the 
Constitution imposes substantive constraints on evidence, they must be 
found elsewhere. There should be nothing startling about the idea that 
the Confrontation Clause has a limited scope. 
Moreover, I believe that this limitation actually increases the 
effectiveness of the Clause. To be clear, I do not believe that the aim of 
scholars should be to try to develop a construction of the Clause that 
maximizes the evidence it excludes. Rather, as I have put the point 
repeatedly in amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, I believe our aim 
should be—or at least mine is—“to promote a sound understanding of 
the confrontation right, one that recognizes the importance of the right 
in our system of criminal justice and at the same time is practical in 
administration and does not unduly hamper prosecution of crime.”48 But 
it is still a fair question whether Crawford, by narrowing the scope of 
the Clause but prescribing a categorical right within that scope, has on 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004). 
 45. Id. at 61; supra Part I.  
 46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 47. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1700–03. 
 48. See, e.g., Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2013) (No. 10-8505). 
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net benefitted criminal defendants. From Professor Trachtenberg’s 
focus on one class of statements that, he asserts, would have been 
excluded under Roberts but not under Crawford, it appears that he 
regards the answer as doubtful.49 I do not. Although I am not happy 
about some post-Crawford decisions that, in my view, have taken an 
unduly narrow view of the confrontation right,50 I think there is no 
doubt that the Clause has more force after Crawford than it did before. 
And, though the proposition is less subject to proof, I believe that force 
is attributable in part to the limitation in scope. 
The facts of Crawford suggest the first of these propositions: Sylvia 
Crawford made a formal, audiotaped statement to the police in the 
station house describing a knife fight that had occurred earlier that 
day.51 Everyone in the room knew at the time that the police were 
taking the statement for possible use in preparation of a criminal 
prosecution.52 And yet the trial court admitted the statement, and the 
Washington Supreme Court held that doing so did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause.53 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in 
Crawford reviewed some of the common types of testimonial 
statements that courts frequently admitted during the Roberts regime, 
such as statements at plea allocutions and accomplice confessions 
implicating the accused.54 There is no doubt now that the Confrontation 
Clause bars use of such statements absent an opportunity for 
confrontation. 
Consider also Hammon v. Indiana.55 There, while a police officer 
held Hershel Hammon at bay, his wife, sitting in their living room with 
another officer, accused him of having assaulted her earlier that 
evening.56 She made an oral statement to the officer and immediately 
thereafter signed an affidavit to the same effect. At trial, before 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1695–96. 
 50. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2010), I thought the Court should have 
established that a statement to a known police officer accusing another of a crime is per se 
testimonial. Instead, the Court held that a statement made primarily to resolve an ongoing 
emergency is not testimonial. Id. at 828. In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150, 1167 
(2011), the Court applied the emergency doctrine to hold a statement accusing the defendant of 
a shooting nontestimonial even though it was made half an hour after the shooting and several 
blocks away. In Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012), a fractured Court held that a 
lab report of a DNA test performed on material taken from a vaginal swab of a rape victim was 
not testimonial. 
 51. 541 U.S. at 38–39. 
 52. See id. at 53 n.4. 
 53. Id. at 38, 41. 
 54. Id. at 63–65. 
 55. 547 U.S. 813 (2010). This case was decided together with Davis v. Washington. I 
represented Hammon in the Supreme Court. 
 56. Id. at 819–20. 
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Crawford came down, the court held both statements admissible.57 
When Hammon’s counsel objected to admission of the affidavit, the 
prosecution responded that it was made under oath.58 “That doesn't give 
us the opportunity to cross examine [the] person who allegedly drafted 
it,” replied defense counsel. “Makes me mad.” The trial court advised 
counsel with withering scorn, “You might want to refresh your memory 
regarding the hearsay rules,” and then held that the affidavit satisfied 
the hearsay exception for present sense impressions and thus did not 
pose a confrontation problem.59 After Crawford, the state conceded that 
admission of the affidavit was error60—and eight Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court held, as Crawford should have put beyond doubt, that 
admission of the officer’s testimony of the oral statement was also a 
confrontation violation.61 
Finally, note the dramatic transformation concerning forensic lab 
reports. Before Crawford, many jurisdictions routinely admitted them 
without any live testimony by the persons who prepared them.62 The 
Confrontation Clause posed no obstacle. But now, as a result of a 
“rather straightforward application” of Crawford’s holding in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts,63 that has changed. If the prosecution wishes to 
introduce a lab report purporting to show, for example, that a given 
material was cocaine or that the accused had an elevated blood alcohol 
level, then absent a stipulation (which the accused is often willing to 
make), the prosecution must ordinarily provide the author of the report 
as a live witness.64 
The categorical nature of the confrontation right as articulated in 
Crawford clearly has contributed to its increased vigor: If a statement is 
testimonial, and there has been no opportunity for confrontation, then it 
is clear, with only narrow qualifications, that there has been a violation 
of the right.65 There is wiggle room, of course, in determining what 
types of statements are testimonial,66 but there is considerably less of it 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 820. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hammon v. Indiana, 132 S. Ct. 2221 
(2012) (No. 05-5705.), 2005 WL 3617526, at *19–20. 
 60. Id. at *106. 
 61. Davis, 547 U.S. at 815, 834 (companion case). 
 62. See, e.g., Valerie J. Silverman, Testing the Testimonial Doctrine: The Impact of 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts on State-Level Criminal Prosecutions and Procedure, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2011) (describing the change in procedure for lab report admission in 
Massachusetts and Virginia). 
 63. 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009). 
 64. Id. at 311, 328. 
 65. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). One qualification is that the accused 
may have forfeited the right. The Court has also left open the possibility that there is a separate 
dying-declaration exception to the right. Id. at 56 n.6. 
 66. The Court in Crawford intentionally avoided defining “testimonial.” Id. at 68. 
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than there was under Roberts in determining that a statement was 
reliable. In part the difference is attributable to the facts that a statement 
could be deemed reliable under Roberts because of case-specific 
factors, but to a large extent the appellate courts resolve as a general 
matter the question of whether a given type of statement is testimonial. 
One could, of course, imagine a doctrine that combined Crawford 
and Roberts, providing that a statement may not be admissible for its 
truth against an accused if either (a) it is testimonial and the accused has 
not had an opportunity to be confronted with the person who made the 
statement, or (b) it is deemed unreliable by the court. But there would 
be no logic holding together such an artificially constructed doctrine. 
The simple, fundamental principle that underlies the Confrontation 
Clause as articulated in Crawford—that a witness against an accused 
should testify in the presence of the accused, subject to cross-
examination—would again be obscured. And over time, I believe, a 
type of entropy would set in. Given the back-up of a fuzzy reliability 
test, courts would be tempted to minimize the scope and importance of 
the relatively hard-edged testimonial test, and ultimately we would be 
left with something very much like the Roberts test once again. To be 
sure, this prediction is speculative, but I believe it reflects the way of the 
world. In any given case, the loss of evidentiary value that may be 
created by insisting on the confrontation right is usually more salient 
than the long-term harm of diminishing the right. And so there would be 
a tendency to weaken the right, little by little. 
III.  THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NONTESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS 
I will proceed now on the assumption that, as Crawford suggested 
and subsequent cases make clear, the Confrontation Clause simply does 
not apply to nontestimonial statements.67 Operating on the same 
assumption—about which he is less happy than I am—Professor 
Trachtenberg contends that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments should act as “constitutional backstops” to 
require the exclusion of nontestimonial hearsay that is offered against 
an accused and that a court deems unreliable.68 I am dubious. I will not 
go so far as to deny the possibility that some nontestimonial evidence 
might be so potentially prejudicial and have so little probative value that 
it ought to be rendered constitutionally inadmissible. But as a general 
matter, I think there is no need for a constitutional bar on nontestimonial 
hearsay. Indeed, I will go further: For the most part, if live testimony of 
the declarant to a given proposition would be admissible, then usually 
evidentiary law, as well as constitutional law, should be receptive to 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
823–25 (2006). 
 68. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1702. 
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evidence that the declarant made a nontestimonial assertion of that 
proposition out of court. Note that by confining this claim to 
nontestimonial assertions, I am putting aside cases in which admission 
of the hearsay evidence would amount to allowing witnesses to testify 
out of court. 
A.  Reliability 
When a statement is not testimonial, why should hearsay not be 
admitted? Professor Trachtenberg worries, as others have, about the 
admissibility of unreliable evidence.69 I find the concern perplexing. For 
one thing, like most of those who use the term, Professor Trachtenberg 
makes no attempt to define reliability. So I offer my own definition, one 
that I believe captures the sense of the term as used in ordinary 
parlance: Evidence is reliable proof of a given proposition if and only if, 
given the evidence, it is highly improbable that the proposition is false. 
Note that this is a very demanding standard. So one problem is that 
very few items of evidence meet it; on some contested issues, none at 
all will do so. Apart from that, our conception of a trial is not that the 
court winnows out all unreliable evidence, allowing the jurors to hear 
only evidence that appears to point them in the right direction. If it 
were, there would be really nothing left to try, because the outcome 
would be predetermined. Indeed, the epitome of acceptable evidence—
live testimony of eyewitnesses—is notoriously unreliable.70 The essence 
of a trial is to present the trier of fact with a range of evidence, which 
may point in both directions and much of which might be extremely 
unreliable, and leave it to the trier to do the best it can to weigh the 
evidence on both sides and reach a conclusion. A trial is a test, and we 
should not shrink from the facts that trials deal with imperfect inputs 
and  that they may have uncertain outcomes. 
B.  The Probative–Prejudicial Balance 
Perhaps a response to the argument I have just made is that I am 
simply quibbling with terminology, and that the true question is whether 
the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Reliability is a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for that test to be satisfied. But 
there is no basis for concluding that hearsay in general tends to be more 
prejudicial than probative. On the contrary, if live testimony of the 
declarant to a given proposition would be more probative than 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See id. at 1702–03. 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1968); Understand the Causes: 
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ 
Eyewitness Misidentification.php (“Eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of 
wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a role in nearly 75% of convictions overturned through 
DNA testing.”). 
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prejudicial, then, in most cases, secondary evidence that the declarant 
has asserted the proposition would be more probative than prejudicial as 
well.71 True, the secondary evidence deprives the trier of fact of some of 
the tools it might find useful in assessing the truthfulness of the 
declarant, but that in itself does not warrant exclusion. To justify 
excluding the evidence on this basis, we would have to conclude not 
only that the trier of fact is unable to take this factor into account and 
discount the weight it places on the evidence accordingly; we would 
also have to conclude that the defect is so great, and the trier’s inability 
so pronounced, that the trier’s probable overvaluation of the evidence, if 
it is presented to them, is greater in significance than the loss of 
probative value if the evidence is excluded. But so far as I am aware, 
there is no empirical evidence that jurors tend to overvalue hearsay to 
this degree, or indeed at all. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that 
jurors undervalue hearsay, and there has certainly been no 
demonstration that the use of hearsay, rather than of no evidence at all 
from the declarant, impairs the search for truth.72 
It appears, then, that in most cases in which a live witness’s 
testimony of a given proposition would be more probative than 
prejudicial, the same conclusion can be drawn about hearsay evidence 
tending to prove that the same person made a nontestimonial out-of-
court assertion of the proposition. That is not the end of the story, 
though. 
C.  Best-Evidence Considerations 
It is possible that the hearsay should be excluded, even though it is 
more probative than prejudicial, on best-evidence grounds. That is, in 
some circumstances it may be that exclusion of this hearsay will induce 
the proponent, or others similarly situated, to present better evidence 
than the hearsay—presumably, the live testimony of the declarant at 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1961, 1976 (1997). 
 72. Much of the literature is reviewed in Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the Scientific 
Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1149 (2003). Professor Park concludes that 
“it is difficult to draw broad, general inferences from the empirical literature about the impact of 
hearsay evidence.” Id. at 1167. As he points out, the question of impact, whether hearsay “is 
strong medicine,” is not the important one for determining legal impact; that issue, rather, is 
“whether hearsay evidence helps or hurts the quest for accurate verdicts,” and an experiment 
will not help determine that unless the investigator knows “the ground truth.” Id. According to 
Park, “[t]here have been two hearsay experiments in which the experimenters started with a real 
incident, knew the ground truth, and sought to examine whether jurors could use hearsay 
reliably in reaching accurate verdicts.” Id. Although Park acknowledges that “it is hard to draw 
too much from them because neither experiment involved cross-examination,” he points out that 
“[t]hey both reached results that should provide comfort to those who favor wider admission of 
hearsay.” Id. at 1168. 
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trial, or at least at a deposition.73 
1.  The Unavailable Declarant 
At least in the usual case, exclusion can be warranted on best-
evidence grounds only if the declarant is available, or would have been 
available had the proponent acted with reasonable diligence. If, for 
example, the declarant died shortly after making the statement, the 
proponent was not responsible for the death, and the proponent could 
not reasonably have anticipated a later evidentiary need for the 
statement, then the proponent should not be held to account for failure 
to produce the declarant as a live witness at trial or deposition.74 
Similarly, if the declarant is a person whose identity the proponent 
could not reasonably be expected to know, it would make no sense to 
exclude the hearsay on best-evidence grounds.75 
2.  The Available Declarant 
Even if the declarant is available, I think the law should usually be 
hesitant to exclude nontestimonial hearsay to induce the proponent to 
produce live testimony. The situation is rather subtle and complex; here 
I present only a very brief summary of an argument I have made 
elsewhere.76 
Bear in mind three propositions that are true by hypothesis:  (1) the 
hearsay is not testimonial in nature; (2) it is more probative than 
prejudicial; and (3) the proponent is satisfied to rely on the hearsay 
rather than go to the trouble and expense of producing the declarant. 
Also, given that the proponent could produce the declarant as a live 
witness, then presumably the opponent also could do so, if he cared 
enough about examining her. That, it appears to me, should ordinarily 
be enough to satisfy constitutional concerns.77 
But my analysis goes further. In most cases, even if the declarant is 
available, I do not believe that, as a matter of policy, best-evidence 
considerations call for outright exclusion of the evidence. Given that the 
                                                                                                                     
 73. It is also possible that exclusion of the hearsay will induce the proponent to present 
live or deposition testimony, to the same proposition, given by another witness who is more 
easily available than the hearsay declarant. For simplicity’s sake, I will put aside this relatively 
unusual case. 
 74. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 282 
(1988). 
 75. Cf. id. at 248 n.105 (noting that what today is often called the “best-evidence rule” 
does not apply if the evidence is unavailable through no fault of the proponent).  
 76. Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of 
Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 764–82 (1992). 
 77. It would not be if the hearsay were testimonial and offered against an accused. Putting 
the burden on the accused to call a prosecution witness to the stand is not allowed. Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). 
15
Friedman: The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
448 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
hearsay evidence the proponent wishes to introduce is more probative 
than prejudicial, and that the opponent could produce the declarant as a 
live witness, the hearsay ought to be admissible unless there is good 
reason for excluding it. What good reason might there be? 
One reason might be that the opponent would have a sound basis for 
being reluctant to call the declarant as his own witness solely for the 
chance of cross-examination.78 Most significantly, such a move is risky 
because it will appear perplexing if the cross is not highly productive. 
Sometimes this problem is a significant one, and sometimes not—it may 
be that the opponent would have little interest in seeing the declarant 
testify as a live and perhaps very persuasive witness.79 But in any event, 
I believe that adopting a simple procedural feature will address this 
problem and often lead to better results: If the opponent of the hearsay 
timely produces the declarant, ready and able to testify, then the 
proponent should usually be required to choose whether to present the 
live testimony of the declarant as part of his case or forgo use of the 
evidence.80  
Another factor weighing in favor of excluding the hearsay may be 
that the proponent is substantially better able than the opponent to 
produce the declarant as a live witness. But even if so, I do not believe 
that exclusion is usually warranted. The chance that the opponent would 
have chosen to produce the declarant, even if his costs of doing so were 
as low as the proponent’s, might be so small that admitting the hearsay 
is still appropriate. For example, if the proponent has an advantage only 
in some part of the tasks necessary to make the declarant a witness 
(identifying the declarant, locating her, securing her presence, and 
ensuring her willingness to testify), it might make sense to impose on 
him only the burden of performing those tasks, and on the opponent the 
burden of performing the others. It might also make sense to give the 
opponent the option of demanding that the proponent produce the 
declarant, but at the opponent’s expense.81  
I acknowledge, nevertheless, that the situation in which the 
proponent is substantially better able than the opponent to produce the 
declarant is the one in which exclusion of hearsay is best justified, 
notwithstanding that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. 
Perhaps in some rather extreme circumstances, if the opponent is a 
criminal defendant, the difficulty is serious enough that the failure of 
the prosecutor to produce the declarant should be considered a due 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 883, 892–93 (1991). 
 79. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 748–49. 
 80. I have elaborated on the reasons for adopting this procedure in Friedman, supra note 
78, at 892–98.  
 81. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 767–75. 
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process violation.82 But bear in mind that by hypothesis, the out-of-
court statement is not testimonial in nature. It was therefore—if a sound 
conception of “testimonial” is used—not made in contemplation of 
prosecution.83 The statement is probative evidence that the prosecution 
is satisfied to use. What then would justify a ruling that the evidence is 
constitutionally inadmissible on the ground that the prosecution could 
have presented better evidence—specifically, live testimony by the 
declarant? I believe the defendant ought to have to prove at least both 
that (1) production of the declarant would be relatively easy and low-
cost for the prosecution and difficult or impossible for the defense, and 
(2) live testimony (including cross-examination) would likely be 
substantially better for the truth-determination process than would 
introduction of the out-of-court statement. Perhaps such a due process 
doctrine is justifiable, and perhaps in some cases the accused could 
make the showing. But this is not a matter of the accused being 
deprived of the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 
IV.  THE CONFORMITY OF HEARSAY LAW TO THE CONFRONTATION 
PRINCIPLE 
Focusing primarily on evidence offered against an accused, I have 
argued that there is usually good reason to exclude hearsay when it is 
testimonial in nature and the opposing party has not had an adequate 
opportunity for cross-examination, and that there is usually not very 
good reason to exclude the evidence otherwise. 84 This Part argues that, 
to a considerable and perhaps surprising extent, prevailing doctrine, as 
stated in the Federal Rules of Evidence, reflects this dichotomy. The 
correlation is not perfect, to be sure, and over time as the confrontation 
principle became obscured, it loosened up in some settings. But for the 
most part, hearsay law replicates—in all settings, not just the one in 
which a prosecutor offers evidence—the doctrine of the Confrontation 
Clause as enunciated in Crawford. If (a) a statement is testimonial, (b) 
the statement is offered for its truth, and (c) the declarant does not 
testify at trial, then the statement will be excluded unless either (c) (1) 
the declarant is unavailable and (2) the party–opponent has had an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination, or (d) the opponent has 
forfeited the objection.85 In circumstances in which these principles do 
not require exclusion, hearsay law tends to be receptive to the evidence. 
I want to focus primarily on the degree to which hearsay law and the 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 726 n.10. 
 83. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 597 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (holding that 
certificates of lab reports were testimonial on the basis that authors were aware of their intended 
evidentiary use). 
 84. See supra Parts II–III.   
 85. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). 
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Confrontation Clause draw a similar line between testimonial and 
nontestimonial statements. But I will help clear the stage by first 
demonstrating several other commonalities, each of which reflects a 
limitation on both the Clause and on the rule against hearsay: 
 
1. If a party makes or adopts a statement and it is then offered 
against him, there is no problem under either the Confrontation Clause 
or hearsay law. As has often been said, an accused has no right to 
confront himself.86 Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) and (B) 
exempt from the hearsay rule statements made or adopted by the party–
opponent.87 
 
2. If the statement in question is not offered for the truth of a 
proposition that it asserts, then neither confrontation doctrine nor the 
rule against hearsay applies. Crawford makes this explicit.88 And so 
does Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2).89 
 
3. If the declarant testifies at trial, that eliminates the confrontation 
problem (under current doctrine) and may eliminate the hearsay 
problem. Again, Crawford is explicit: “[W]hen the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”90 I think 
that is an unfortunate statement,91 but it reflects the current state of 
confrontation doctrine. As for the hearsay rule, significant exemptions 
apply if the declarant testifies at trial—for certain inconsistent 
statements,92 certain consistent statements,93 statements of 
identification,94 and records made while a matter was fresh in the 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 443 (1840) (“[A] man’s own 
acts, conduct, and declarations, when voluntary, are always admissible in evidence against 
him.”); Peter Nicolas, But What If the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden 
Declarants Found in Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1149, 1190 n.172 
(2010) (explaining how the Confrontation Clause problem is eliminated for the prosecutor when 
the accused adopts testimony as his own, because he clearly cannot confront himself). 
 87. A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against an opposing party 
and . . . was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity” or “is one the party 
manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)–(B). 
 88. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (endorsing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 
 89. To fall within the definition of hearsay, a statement must be one that “a party offers in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 90. 541 U.S. at 60 n.9. 
 91. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner 
of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 289–92. 
 92. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 93. Id. 801(d)(1)(B). 
 94. Id. 801(d)(1)(C). 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/8




4. Neither the Confrontation Clause nor the rule against hearsay 
will block admission of a testimonial statement made out of court if the 
witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the party opponent has had 
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Once again, Crawford 
is explicit on this point, which reflects long-standing practice.96 And 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) establishes the same point with 
respect to hearsay law.97  
 
5. Both the confrontation right and an objection to the hearsay rule 
may be forfeited by at least some wrongful conduct that renders the 
declarant unavailable to testify at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6) establishes the forfeiture doctrine as part of hearsay law. 
Crawford recognized the existence of the doctrine as part of the law 
governing the Confrontation Clause.98 The Supreme Court addressed 
the scope of the doctrine, for purposes of the Clause, in Giles v. 
California.99 In my view, Giles gave the doctrine an unduly narrow 
ambit, as does Rule 804(b)(6).100 Properly conceived, I believe that 
forfeiture doctrine would explain the results achieved by the dying 
declaration exception to the rule against hearsay.101 Given the 
limitations on the doctrine established by Giles, the Court will probably 
have to engraft onto the law of the Confrontation Clause an exception 
for dying declarations akin to the one in Rule 804(b)(2).102 That, I 
believe, is very unfortunate, but it need not detain us here. For now, the 
point is that once again the law of hearsay resembles the law of 
confrontation as established in Crawford. 
 
Now let us focus on the divide between testimonial and 
nontestimonial statements. 
 
6. If a statement is offered against an accused and none of the 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. 803(5). 
 96. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”); see also id. at 53–54, 59. 
 97. This rule now appears, of course, as an exception to the hearsay rule. In older days, 
the rule was conceived as an alternative way in which testimony might be presented. See, e.g., 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 336–37 (3d ed. 2004). 
 98. 541 U.S. at 62. 
 99. 554 U.S. 353, 365–66 (2008). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 733, 743–44 (2009). 
 101. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 102. The Court allowed for this possibility in Crawford. See 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
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constraints on the reach of the Confrontation Clause stated above 
apply, then admission of the statement violates the Clause if the 
statement is testimonial, but not otherwise. If none of the constraints 
stated above on the reach of the rule against hearsay applies, admission 
of the statement will probably violate the rule if the statement is 
testimonial and will probably not violate the rule if the statement is not 
testimonial. Four propositions are embedded in this assertion—under 
each of two doctrines, the Confrontation Clause and hearsay law, a 
restrictive proposition concerning testimonial statements and a 
permissive proposition concerning nontestimonial statements. The two 
propositions involving confrontation doctrine are now elementary. 
Suppose that (1) a statement by a person other than the accused is 
offered against the accused to prove the truth of what it asserts, (2) the 
person who made the statement does not testify at trial, (3) either that 
person could reasonably have been made a witness at trial or the 
accused has not had an opportunity for cross-examination, and (4) the 
accused has not forfeited the confrontation right. (For these purposes, I 
will treat the possibility that the statement falls within a dying 
declaration exception as a species of forfeiture.) If the statement is 
testimonial, its admission against the accused violates the confrontation 
right—that is the essence of Crawford.103 And if the statement is 
nontestimonial, its admission does not violate the right. That, as I have 
noted above, has been made clear in subsequent cases.104 
Now consider the hearsay side of the near equation, and first the 
restrictive aspect. Assume (1) the statement is offered for its truth 
against a party and it was not made or adopted by that party, (2) the 
declarant does not testify at trial, (3) either the declarant could 
reasonably have been made a witness at trial or the party opponent has 
not had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, and (4) the party 
opponent has not forfeited the hearsay objection. (Again I treat the 
dying declaration exception as an aspect of forfeiture doctrine.) Assume 
further that the statement is testimonial in nature—which for our 
purposes means that it was made in circumstances that would lead a 
reasonable person in the position of the declarant to believe that the 
statement would likely be used as proof in an identifiable litigation.105 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 68–69. 
 104. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
823–26 (2006); see also supra Part III. 
 105. By the reference to identifiable litigation, I mean to indicate that the declarant was 
aware, at the time of the statement, of a dispute involving a given incident or perhaps given 
parties or a given relationship that either was, or plausibly would be, in litigation. For example, 
if a person makes a statement to the police about what happened in an auto accident, that would 
be testimonial, even if she did not identify the people involved. If she made a statement bearing 
on a litigable dispute with another person, that would be testimonial if offered in litigation 
concerning a later, similar dispute between the same persons. But a statement that, say, records a 
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Given these assumptions, the statement would probably be inadmissible 
under the rule against hearsay. 
To see this, note first that because the statement is offered for the 
truth of what it asserts, it falls within the basic definition of hearsay in 
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(a) through (c), and so is presumptively 
excluded by Rule 802. And by assumption the exemptions most likely 
to apply to testimonial statements—those for prior statements made by a 
witness who testifies at trial, for former testimony by a declarant who is 
unavailable to testify at trial, and for cases of forfeiture and dying 
declarations—do not apply. Look over the list of the other exemptions. 
You will notice that virtually all of them—for family records,106 
statements in ancient documents,107 market reports,108 statements in 
learned treatises,109 and so forth—apply completely or nearly so to 
statements that are not made in contemplation of identifiable litigation. 
To be sure, the line is not perfect. Over the last couple of centuries, 
courts and rulemakers have stretched some of the exemptions to reach 
some testimonial statements. I will consider three primary examples. 
First is the family of exceptions for spontaneous declarations,110 
which emerged in the nineteenth century.111 Earlier courts had been 
careful to admit such statements only if they could be considered part of 
the res gestae, or the story being told, and even in the late nineteenth 
century, courts were sometimes rigorous about not letting this doctrine 
be used to admit statements that really were reports on events.112 Even 
as the doctrine developed into a recognizable exception to the hearsay 
rule, it was supposed to be limited to statements made so spontaneously 
as to preclude the possibility of conscious reflection.113 But by the end 
of the twentieth century, many courts were using these exemptions to 
allow in statements that had been made a considerable time after the 
event in question and quite clearly in contemplation of litigation114—a 
                                                                                                                     
routine transaction would not ordinarily be testimonial. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (noting that business and public records usually are 
not testimonial within the meaning of Confrontation Clause doctrine because they are “created 
for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact at trial,” but holding that the lab analyst’s statements involved in that case, even if 
they might be characterized as business or official records, were “prepared specifically” for use 
at accused’s trial, and so were “testimony against” him). 
 106. FED. R. EVID. 803(13). 
 107. Id. 803(16). 
 108. Id. 803(17). 
 109. Id. 803(18). 
 110. Id. 803(1)–(3). 
 111. See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 18, at 516–18. 
 112. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1213–16. 
 113. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 114. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1200–01. 
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practice that Hammon v. Indiana curbed to some extent.115 
Second is the group of exceptions116 that includes most notably 
those for records of regularly conducted activities117 and for public 
records.118 Almost by definition, most of these are nontestimonial—they 
are made as a matter of ordinary routine and not in contemplation of 
litigation.119 That was very clearly so with respect to the traditional 
“shopbook rule” from which the exception for records of routinely kept 
records emerged.120 But in the modern day, there are some categories of 
statements, most notably forensic laboratory reports, that are made 
routinely and in contemplation of litigation. Some courts recognized 
that these exceptions were not meant to justify admission of reports 
made for prosecutorial use;121 others did not.122 Once again it required a 
Confrontation Clause decision by the Supreme Court—in this case, 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts—to ensure that the hearsay exceptions 
were not used to justify the admission of out-of-court testimonial 
statements.123 
Finally, consider the hearsay exception for declarations against 
interest.124 Traditionally, the rule did not apply to statements tending to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability.125 On the assumption that the 
exception should be shaped in an attempt to guarantee the admissibility 
of reliable evidence, such a limitation makes very little sense.126 The 
limitation is much more sensible, however, if one recognizes that a high 
proportion of statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability are testimonial. The drafters of the Federal Rules, focusing on 
reliability, did away with the limitation. They did, however, indicate 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 820–21, 829–32, 834 (2006) (companion case) 
(determining that Amy Hammon’s oral statement, accusing her husband of assault and made to 
a police officer while she was protected and he was held at bay, was testimonial). 
 116. FED. R . EVID. 803(6)–(10). 
 117. Id. 803(6). 
 118. Id. 803(8). 
 119. That is not necessarily true about some public records, but notice that such records 
that are made in contemplation of prosecution and offered against an accused almost certainly 
fall afoul of the qualifications in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8)(A)(ii) and (iii). 
 120. Developments in Maryland Law, 1991–92, 52 MD. L. REV. 530, 709 n.179 (1993) 
(“The authorities are consistent in finding that the present day business records exception is an 
outgrowth of the common-law ‘shopbook rule.’”).  
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t was the clear 
intention of Congress to make evaluative and law enforcement reports absolutely inadmissible 
against defendants in criminal cases.”). 
 122. See, e.g., State v. Merritt, 591 S.W.2d 107, 112–14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); United 
States v. Evans, 45 C.M.R. 353, 355–56 (1972). 
 123. 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2010); see also supra note 105. 
 124. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 125. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913). 
 126. This was a point made effectively by Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Lurton and 
Hughes, dissenting in the Donnelly case. Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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one significant qualification: “[A] statement admitting guilt and 
implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be 
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail 
to qualify as against interest.”127 In some cases that may be true, but in 
some cases it is almost certainly false—depending on how serious an 
admission of culpability the declarant has made. But such a statement is 
almost certainly testimonial. Nevertheless, courts in the decades after 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not uniformly exclude 
statements made to the authorities by absent declarants who inculpated 
themselves as well as another. One decision tolerating admissibility of 
such a statement was reversed on Confrontation Clause grounds in 
Crawford v. Washington.128 
In each of these three settings, then, an older conception of hearsay 
law would not have allowed admissibility of testimonial hearsay. By the 
beginning of this century, in the absence of a coherent theory of the 
confrontation right, the resistance to allowing testimonial statements 
had softened sufficiently that in these contexts courts often let them slip 
by.129 Crawford and its progeny effectively plugged these holes with 
respect to prosecution evidence.  
I am not, therefore, contending that hearsay law does a perfect job 
of policing against the admission of testimonial statements—far from it. 
I am saying that for the most part, the enumerated exemptions to the 
hearsay rule apply to nontestimonial statements, and that this was 
especially so in older days, before courts and rulemakers, losing track of 
the need to prevent a system by which witnesses could effectively 
testify without coming to trial, loosened up considerably on hearsay that 
appeared likely to be accurate.130 
                                                                                                                     
 127. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note. 
 128. 541 U.S. 36, 38–39, 68–69 (2004). 
 129. There were other examples as well, including the willingness of some courts in the 
decades before Crawford to allow admission of flagrantly testimonial statements made in formal 
settings, such as grand jury proceedings, often using the residual exception (now set forth in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 807) as a way around the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States v. 
Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118–20 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 130.  By referring to “enumerated exceptions,” I mean to set apart the residual exception, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 807. As I have just noted, that exception was sometimes applied 
before Crawford to testimonial statements. Supra note 129. But the history of the exception 
proves the broader point. Creation of the exception (then in two separate provisions, Rules 
803(24) and 804(b)(5)) was controversial; the House of Representatives deleted it from the draft 
of the Rules submitted by the Supreme Court.  In restoring a narrower form of the exception, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee wrote: 
 
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very 
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not 
intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay 
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in 
rules 803 and 804(b). 
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Now let us consider the permissive aspect of the assertion I have 
made about hearsay—that is, that if a statement is not testimonial, 
hearsay law will very likely tolerate its admissibility. I cannot 
demonstrate this proposition to a certainty or anywhere near, at least not 
in the space available here. But the proposition is not one that scholars 
would find surprising.131 And its truth is suggested by the profusion of 
exemptions that apply to nontestimonial hearsay, some purportedly 
supported by very dubious grounds of reliability,132 and the invitation 
extended by the residual exception133 to admit, on case-specific 
grounds, hearsay not falling within the recognized exemptions. 
Let us consider in this light the exemption for conspirator 
statements,134 which lies near the heart of Professor Trachtenberg’s 
argument. I agree with much of what he says in this context: The 
traditional rationales offered for the exemption are very weak.135 The 
proposition that one conspirator is an agent of the other(s) presumably 
justified inclusion of this exemption in Rule 801(d)(2), along with other 
variants of what have traditionally been called party admissions—but 
even the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule asserted that “the 
agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction.”136 The argument that 
statements by a conspirator have significance in themselves, not merely 
as reports but as part of the conspiracy in operation, sometimes has 
                                                                                                                     
 
S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066. Active use of the 
residual exception to admit testimonial evidence was therefore a development of the late 
twentieth century. 
 131. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 & n.3; 
Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
797, 799–800 (1992) (“[I]t is only a marginal overstatement to say that today, at least in civil 
cases, the hearsay rule applies in any robust fashion only to available nonparty witnesses within 
the subpoena power of the court. And it does not apply to them very rigorously. . . . The hearsay 
rule is, in short, no longer a rule of exclusion; it is instead a rule of admission that is doing its 
subversive work under the cover of darkness.” (footnote omitted)). 
 132. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a 
Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 651 (1992) (“[T]he 
‘reliability’ rationale of the exception for spontaneous declarations has been more the result of 
tradition than of fact, and has been soundly criticized by commentators—a fact ignored by the 
Supreme Court.”); id. at 651 n.110 (“If judged from the standpoint of the reliability of the 
representations on the basis of perception, the law relating to the admission of spontaneous 
exclamations is amazing. If the observer speaks before he thinks, the evidence is admissible; if 
he thinks before he speaks, it is excluded.” (quoting Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 
OKLA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1952))). 
 133. See FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 134. See id. 801(d)(2)(E). As noted above, supra note 6, I am referring to “conspirators” 
rather than to “co-conspirators” in deference to Professor Duane, the leading scholar (albeit by 
default) on that choice. 
 135. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1686–88. 
 136. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note. 
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force; a prosecutor does, indeed, often have to show how conspiracies 
operate, and often they operate in large part through the statements of 
their members. But often the principal reason for which the proponent 
offers the statement is to prove the truth of what the conspirator said.137 
And the idea that conspirators’ statements tend to be especially reliable 
is, as Professor Trachtenberg suggests, nonsense.138 As a class, I do not 
believe that they are any more reliable than was the statement, discussed 
below, of the Portuguese gentleman in Raleigh. 
But where does that leave us? Professor Trachtenberg argues that 
conspirators’ statements are admissible on grounds of necessity—
convicting conspirators is an important social aim, and because 
conspirators make conviction difficult by acting secretively, it is 
necessary to bend principle and admit evidence that would otherwise be 
unacceptable.139 Frankly, I find the suggestion startling. If the exclusion 
of a given form of evidence really does reflect a fundamental principle, 
it would be disturbing to allow it in nonetheless to facilitate conviction 
of a given type of crime. Such a doctrine, I think, would be very hard to 
confine, with respect to either the crimes it might address (especially 
because conspiracy is far from the most serious, or the most difficult to 
prove, of all crimes), or the rights of an accused that we would be 
willing to abridge. Indeed, it would seem to apply equally to evidence 
of other out-of-court statements tending to prove that the accused was a 
member of the conspiracy, whether the declarant was a member of the 
conspiracy or not.140 
I have an alternative explanation for the exemption. In accordance 
with the arguments I have made in this Essay, assume that if live 
testimony by a person to a proposition would be admissible, then 
evidence that the person made a nontestimonial assertion of that 
proposition should probably be admitted as well. Then the exemption 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1689 (citing United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 
(7th Cir. 1979)). 
 138. Id. at 1687–88. 
 139. Id. at 1689. 
 140. Thus, it appears to me that this rationale would apply equally in two cases in which 
Professor Trachtenberg argues vigorously that the evidence should be excluded. Id. at 1696–99, 
1709–13. In United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 554–55 (5th Cir. 2011), discussed below 
in Section V.B, the defendants were accused of participating in a conspiracy, which was proved 
in part by statements made before the confederates’ activities were illegal. And in the Raleigh 
case, discussed in Section V.A, the statements at issue asserted that Raleigh was part of a 
conspiracy to kill the king. In Raleigh, neither statement would satisfy the exemption because 
one was made by a nonconspirator (the Portuguese gentleman) and the other, Cobham’s 
confession to the authorities (which was clearly testimonial), clearly did not support the 
conspiracy. But any of these statements, it appears, would satisfy the necessity rationale 
advanced by Professor Trachtenberg; the calculus under that rationale does not appear to be 
affected by the fact that, at the time of the statement, the person making it was not a member of 
the charged conspiracy speaking in furtherance of it. 
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for conspirator statements marks out a segment of the border between 
nontestimonial statements, which presumably should be admitted, and 
testimonial ones, which presumably should be excluded. On the one 
hand, if a statement is genuinely made during the course of and in 
furtherance of a conspiracy, then virtually by definition it is not 
testimonial—in making the statement, the declarant was trying to 
advance the aims of the conspiracy, and presumably she would not have 
made the statement if she believed there was a substantial probability 
that it would instead become evidence used to destroy the conspiracy 
and punish its members. Thus, the confrontation principle does not pose 
an obstacle to admission, and the exemption ensures that neither does 
the rule against hearsay. On the other hand, if a conspirator tells a 
known police officer about the activities of the conspiracy, that 
statement presumably is inimical to the interests of the conspiracy and 
so should not fall within the exemption.141 It is also almost certainly 
testimonial in nature. Thus, the two doctrines yield the same result in 
this context as well: the confrontation right demands exclusion and the 
exemption does not remove the hearsay bar. 
Again, I am not suggesting that hearsay doctrine perfectly reflects 
the confrontation principle; given that the principle was obscured for so 
long, that could hardly be true. I do believe that much of hearsay 
doctrine represents a groping in the dark for an underlying value. That 
value is not that unreliable evidence ought to be excluded. It is, rather, 
that a witness should testify in the presence of an adverse party, subject 
to cross-examination. 
V.  TWO APPLICATIONS 
I argue in this Essay for a rather strong dichotomy. On the one hand, 
the law should insist on preserving the right of a criminal defendant to 
demand that witnesses against him testify face-to-face and are subject to 
cross-examination. On the other hand, the law should take a far more 
receptive attitude than it does now towards nontestimonial hearsay. 
Arguing against such receptivity, Professor Trachtenberg invokes the 
case of Sir Walter Raleigh.142 And at the heart of his Essay lies his 
objection to the willingness of some courts to admit statements on a 
“lawful joint venture” theory. This Part addresses both these matters. 
A.  The Raleigh Case 
                                                                                                                     
 141. I realize that some nontestimonial statements made by a conspirator might be relevant 
to the case and yet fall outside the formal bounds of the exemption—for example, “idle chatter” 
and statements made after the conspiracy has achieved its principal aim or been abandoned. But 
courts are resourceful in finding that these statements served the purpose of the conspiracy—by 
recruiting members and customers, for example—and that the conspiracy was still in force at the 
time of the statement. 
 142. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1709–11. 
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One of the statements used to convict Raleigh would probably now 
be considered nontestimonial. Professor Trachtenberg seems to assume 
that any theory that allows presentation of hearsay of the type used 
against Raleigh must be seriously deficient. I will take the issue head-
on: I acknowledge that under my approach, the confrontation right 
would probably not exclude evidence of the statement—but I do not 
regard this as troublesome. 
As Professor Trachtenberg points out, the Raleigh case involved two 
significant statements that would now be considered hearsay. One of 
these—and the one that I believe is primarily responsible for the infamy 
of the case—was the confession of Raleigh’s principal accuser, Lord 
Cobham, who, as Raleigh said, was “alive, and in the house.”143 In the 
parlance of Crawford, the statement was clearly testimonial, and 
Raleigh made vigorous, persistent, and repeated complaints against his 
prosecutors’ failure to bring Cobham “face-to-face” against him at 
trial.144 He emphasized that this failure violated the basic precepts of a 
fair English trial. “If there be but a trial of five marks at Common Law,” 
he argued, “a witness must be deposed. Good my lords, let my Accuser 
come face to face, and be deposed.”145 And it was clear that his 
objection, though ultimately of no avail to him, registered with his 
listeners.146 Apart from emphasizing the validity of confessions, neither 
the Commissioners trying the case nor Attorney General Coke 
challenged Raleigh’s contention that the norm in an ordinary, non-
treason case would have been to bring the accusing witnesses face-to-
face. Cobham’s statement, in short, was a testimonial accusation, and by 
a witness who was readily available—and the dispute over it indicates 
that, even at the time, allowing it to be used without producing Cobham 
appeared to be a violation of fundamental principles. 
In contrast, consider the second hearsay statement, the one Professor 
Trachtenberg emphasizes.147 One Dyer, a pilot, testified that in Lisbon 
he had the following encounter with a gentleman: 
[E]nquiring what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman. 
Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I 
                                                                                                                     
 143. 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 19 (1809); see also id. at 23. 
 144. Id. at 15, 18, 19, 23. 
 145. Id. at 19. 
 146. Lord Chief Justice Popham contended that “[w]here no circumstances do concur to 
make a matter probable, then an accuser may be heard; but so many circumstances agreeing and 
confirming the accusation in this case, the accuser is not to be produced.” 1 DAVID JARDINE, 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1835). In the end he and the prosecutors were driven to fall back on 
arguments of state security, which essentially presuppose the guilt of the prisoner. For example, 
Judge Popham referred to communications between Raleigh and Cobham before the trial, with 
the innuendo that Raleigh may have bribed Cobham to change his testimony. 2 COBBETT’S, 
supra note 143, at 20. 
 147. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1709–10. 
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answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly. 
Nay, saith he, he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh 
and Don Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come.148 
Raleigh challenged the usefulness of the evidence, to be sure, but for 
its lack of probative value rather than for any fundamental violation of 
procedure. “This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly Priest,” 
he said, “but what proof is it against me?”149 The chief prosecutor, 
Attorney General Coke, responded: “It must per force arise out of some 
preceding intelligence, and shows that your treason had wings.”150 In 
other words, Coke contended that the evidence had circumstantial value 
because the Portuguese gentleman could not be thought to have come 
up with the story of Raleigh’s involvement unless there were some 
basis—“some preceding intelligence”—for the statement. And in reply, 
Raleigh offered an alternative explanation, making a short speech to the 
effect that it was not surprising that Cobham’s treason in aid of Spain 
had become known in Lisbon, and that his own name was presumably 
thrown in to add weight to the conspiracy.151 But he did not press the 
matter. He did not argue, for example, that efforts should be made to 
produce, or even identify, the Portuguese gentleman. Nor did he argue 
that because of the failure of the prosecution to make such efforts, or 
simply because of the absence of the Portuguese gentleman—which 
meant that his statement was unsworn, that the triers had no opportunity 
to evaluate his demeanor, and that Raleigh had no opportunity for cross-
examination—the statement should not be presented. 
In short, Raleigh’s reaction to the statement of the Portuguese 
gentleman was not based on the assertion that his right to be brought 
face-to-face with an adverse witness had been violated. And a 
comparison of his treatment of that statement with that of Cobham’s 
suggests that it is the latter, and not the former, that is responsible for 
the infamy that the prosecution of Raleigh has suffered for centuries. 
But suppose that a case like this arose today. What should happen, 
given the limitation of the confrontation right to testimonial statements? 
Let’s put aside the possibility that the statement should be considered 
testimonial, though the matter is not completely free from doubt.152 And 
                                                                                                                     
 148. 2 COBBETT’S, supra note 143, at 25. 
 149. 1 JARDINE, supra note 146, at 436. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 2 COBBETT’S, supra note 143, at 25. 
 152. If the statement was made with the anticipation that it would in fact be passed on and 
used in a prosecution, then it should be considered testimonial. It could be that the statement 
was a surreptitious attempt to plant evidence that would be used to help prosecute Raleigh. So 
far as I know, however, there is no evidence that this was true of the Portuguese gentleman’s 
statement. Also, one could argue that when a person makes a statement accusing another of a 
crime, and does so beyond a closed circle of people whom he can trust not to pass the 
information on to the authorities, the statement is necessarily testimonial, because there is a 
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I will put aside also the possibility that the statement ought to be 
admitted on grounds similar to those enunciated by Coke—not to prove 
the truth of what it asserts but as circumstantial evidence that the 
conspiracy was afoot. Let’s assume instead that the prosecutor takes the 
bull by the horns and offers the statement to prove that Raleigh was in 
fact part of a conspiracy to murder the king. By hypothesis, the 
Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion. For several reasons, I 
am not troubled by this.  
First is a matter of principle: The Portuguese gentleman, by 
hypothesis, simply was not acting as a witness against Raleigh. 
Allowing evidence of what he said, whatever problems it might pose, 
does not contribute to a system by which witnesses can testify against 
criminal defendants without coming face-to-face and being subjected to 
cross-examination. 
Second, there is no particular reason to suppose that a jury would 
fail to recognize the factors that diminish the probative value of the 
evidence. And there is no basis for concluding that the jury’s 
overvaluation of the evidence would be so great that its prejudicial 
impact would be greater than its probative value. If this is correct, then 
the evidence advances the truth-determination process. And of course if 
a court regards it as incorrect, the court would presumably exclude the 
evidence on that basis.153 
Third, other nonconstitutional doctrines also might call for the 
evidence to be excluded. In particular, it appears that there was no 
showing that the Portuguese gentleman spoke from personal 
knowledge.154 (Most American courts would probably regard it as 
inadmissible hearsay, though under the analysis presented here—given 
that the statement is nontestimonial and that the prosecutor was 
presumably in no better a position than the accused to produce the 
declarant—an optimal system would not reach this result.)  
Fourth, I believe that, to the extent admissibility of the Portuguese 
gentleman’s statement appears frightening, it is because of the thought 
that a conviction could be based on it alone. But in fact, if there is no 
other substantial evidence of Raleigh’s guilt, the court should conclude 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a verdict, and grant the 
defense a motion to dismiss the charge as a matter of law. A jury could 
not reasonably conclude that Raleigh’s guilt was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by Dyer’s testimony that an unidentified declarant 
                                                                                                                     
substantial probability that it will indeed be passed on. I might find such a rule rather attractive, 
but I do not believe the Supreme Court is likely to adopt it in the foreseeable future. 
 153. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 154. See id. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”); id.  803 
advisory committee’s note (stating that a hearsay “declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither 
this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge” in Rule 602). 
29
Friedman: The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
462 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
made a statement asserting, without elaboration, that Raleigh was 
conspiring to kill the king. In a sufficiently egregious case, failure to 
grant judgment as a matter of law could be considered constitutional 
error.  If, on the other hand, we assume that there is sufficient evidence 
to support a verdict of guilt, and the Portuguese gentleman was 
recounting in idle conversation an event that he had personally 
observed—say, that Raleigh and Cobham had entered a tavern 
together—it does not seem so horrifying to allow that to be added to the 
mix of evidence that the jury may consider. 
Finally, suppose we alter the facts slightly in another way, and there 
is enough evidence to support a finding that the Portuguese gentleman 
was a member of the conspiracy at the time he made the statement, and 
that making it advanced the purposes of the conspiracy, perhaps by 
helping to recruit members. Then the statement would fit within the 
hearsay exemption for conspirators’ statements and would satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause under pre-Crawford law. But, as Professor 
Trachtenberg’s article indicates, the statement is not substantially more 
reliable given the assumption that it fits within the exemption than it is 
absent the assumption.155 
In short, perhaps the Portuguese gentleman’s statement should not 
be admitted, and it certainly ought not support a verdict on its own. But 
it does not appear to pose a problem under the Confrontation Clause. 
B.  Lawful Joint Ventures 
Under the “lawful joint venture” theory, as ably described by 
Professor Trachtenberg, some courts have been willing to admit against 
a party a statement made in support of a joint undertaking of which that 
party was a member, without proof that the venture was illegal.156 
Professor Trachtenberg argues that such statements have no particular 
guarantees of reliability.157 I agree. But this is not to say that such 
hearsay is not useful evidence. In fact, it may well be extremely useful. 
Consider United States v. El-Mezain,158 the case on which Professor 
Trachtenberg particularly focuses.159 In that case, a prosecution for 
funneling money to Hamas, which the United States and many other 
nations regard as a terrorist organization, the prosecution introduced a 
trove of documents discovered in the homes of two unindicted 
conspirators.160 As described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1685–89. 
 156. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1669. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 159. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1697–700. He also discusses United States v. Gewin, 
471 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2006), which I address infra note 165. 
 160. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 484, 494. 
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Circuit, these documents “included annual reports, meeting agendas and 
minutes, financial records, work papers, and telephone directories that 
documented the activities of the Palestine Committee [a supervisory 
organization for many of the acts charged] and demonstrated the 
defendants’ participation with the Committee.”161 The documents were 
extensive and detailed, and provided clear support for the proposition 
that the defendants were working at that time to raise money for Hamas. 
At the time, Hamas had not yet been classified as a terrorist 
organization, so the activities reported were not illegal, but clearly they 
were relevant to the defendants’ later activities.162  
With a proper foundation, these documents, or at least most of them, 
presumably could have been admitted as routinely kept records. But the 
prosecution did not lay that foundation.163 Nor could it bring the 
documents within the bounds of the conspirator exemption as 
traditionally understood, because, at that point, the venture described 
was legal.164 But under Fifth Circuit law,165 a statement can qualify 
under the conspirator exemption, established for the federal courts in 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), even though it was “made in furtherance of a lawful 
joint undertaking.”166 
I will not quarrel with Professor Trachtenberg’s view that this 
doctrine extends the Rule beyond its intended meaning.167 That, of 
course, illustrates the tendency of courts, as I have noted above, to find 
a way to loosen the bounds of hearsay law. And in this case, the result 
itself—putting aside legal-process concerns created by distortion of the 
current Rule—strikes me as perfectly sound. The documents were 
clearly nontestimonial. They were certainly not written in anticipation 
that they would be used as evidence in a prosecution, or indeed in any 
other kind of case. Rather, at least on their face, they appear to be 
recordings of an ongoing operation intended to assist and promote its 
activities. They appear to have been written by one or more persons in a 
position to know the truth and without any incentive to mislead a reader 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Id. at 501. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 498–501. 
 164. Id. at 501–03. 
 165. The Fifth Circuit is not alone in taking this view. Professor Trachtenberg also 
discusses United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006), in which the District of 
Columbia Circuit noted that this was the long-established law of the Circuit. But in that case, the 
key statement, in Professor Trachtenberg’s rendition, was in effect, “I’ll tell the CEO,” offered 
to prove that the speaker did in fact tell the CEO. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1690. Under the 
traditional Hillmon doctrine, which was clearly intended to be incorporated by Federal Rule 
Evidence 803(3), that evidence is admissible as a statement of a then-existing state of mind. See 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892). 
 166. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 502. 
 167. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1689–92. I also do not mean to engage in a debate 
over the merits of the prosecution. 
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in any way material to their later use in litigation. They were highly 
probative; even if one believes that the documents were not particularly 
reliable, that does not mean they lacked substantial probative value. On 
the contrary, I believe that most reasonable jurors would regard the 
documents as having altered substantially the probability in favor of the 
truth of the propositions asserted in the documents. 
In short, though it may stretch standard doctrine to exempt 
statements of this sort from the rule against hearsay, this is a result 
that—whether by stretching the rule as it stands or by changing it—
ought to be reached. Perhaps in succeeding generations, admission of 
documents like this will not appear to be such a stretch. In the next Part, 
I will offer a few thoughts on how the law might look in those 
generations. 
VI.  A GLANCE AHEAD 
I believe that the transformation of confrontation doctrine wrought 
by Crawford has given us a great opportunity to reframe hearsay law, 
for two reasons. First, Crawford has helped us focus on the fact that the 
principal reason why some hearsay ought to be excluded is that to admit 
it would essentially allow a witness to testify without confronting the 
adverse party or being subjected to cross-examination. When the 
adverse party is a criminal defendant, that problem of course renders the 
evidence constitutionally invalid. But even when another litigant is the 
adverse party, the fact that the hearsay is testimonial in nature is at least 
an important consideration; we expect witnesses to provide evidence for 
trial by testifying at trial, not by, say, signing an affidavit. 
Second, hearsay law has been called on to implement the 
confrontation principle. As the analysis in Part IV suggests, it has done 
so in a clumsy and very imperfect way—by a broad presumptive 
exclusion of all hearsay and then by carving out from that definition a 
long set of exemptions that, for the most part, do not cover testimonial 
hearsay. Now that the confrontation right has been separately articulated 
and protected for criminal defendants—which also makes it more likely 
as well that the confrontation principle will be protected in other 
settings—hearsay law can be relaxed in other settings where the hearsay 
is nontestimonial. 
This Part sketches an outline of how hearsay law may be shaped in 
years to come. I do not attempt to be comprehensive here. For 
simplicity, I assume that at the time the hearsay issue is raised, the 
declarant has neither appeared at trial nor been subjected to cross-
examination in a deposition or other proceeding,168 and that neither 
                                                                                                                     
 168.  Whether the opportunity to take a witness’s deposition for discovery purposes 
amounts to an opportunity for cross-examination for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is a 
sharply contested issue. Compare, e.g., State v. Lopez, 974 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2008) (holding in 
the negative), with Berkman v. State, 976 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. App. 2012), transfer denied, 984 
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party has engaged in wrongful conduct that might render her 
unavailable. And I also assume that the court adopts a procedural 
feature suggested above—that if the opponent of the hearsay timely 
produces the declarant, ready and able to testify, then the proponent 
should usually be put to the choice of presenting the live testimony of 
the declarant as part of his case or forgo use of the evidence.169 
In general, I believe the admissibility of hearsay, given the 
assumptions stated above, should depend on the answers to four 
questions: Is the hearsay testimonial? Is the hearsay more probative than 
prejudicial? Is the proponent substantially better able than the opponent 
to produce the declarant? Has the proponent given substantial notice of 
intent to offer the hearsay? I now suggest briefly the bearing each of 
these should have on the result.170 
Is the statement testimonial? Under the assumptions stated, if the 
out-of-court statement is testimonial and it is offered against an accused, 
then admitting it violates the Confrontation Clause. If it is offered 
against another party, the Clause does not apply, but the broader 
confrontation principle—that witnesses testify in the presence of the 
adverse party and are subject to cross-examination—still does, though 
probably it should not apply with equal force.171 
                                                                                                                     
N.E.2d 221 (Ind. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013). I filed the unsuccessful petition for 
certiorari in Berkman, No. 12-10691; it explains reasons why I believe the answer should be 
negative, and the opportunity to take a deposition for discovery purposes should not be 
considered the equivalent, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, of the opportunity for 
cross-examination at a deposition taken by the prosecution to preserve the testimony of a 
witness who will not assuredly appear at trial. Perhaps the considerations are different when the 
confrontation right is not at stake, particularly in a civil case; perhaps then the opportunity to 
take a deposition for discovery purposes should be deemed to be an opportunity for cross-
examination for purposes of the rule against hearsay. That strikes me as a complex issue on 
which my thinking is unsettled and I do not now wish to state any opinion whatever. For 
purposes of the discussion in this Article, then, the assumption that the opponent has not had an 
opportunity for cross-examination in a deposition means that either (a) the opponent had no 
opportunity for a deposition at all, which is true most of the time in most criminal justice 
systems in the United States and could happen even in civil litigation, as with a late-appearing 
witness, or (b) the opponent had an opportunity to question the witness at a deposition, but the 
opportunity is not deemed to be one for cross-examination. Similarly, I am assuming that either 
the opponent had no opportunity to question the witness at another proceeding (such as a 
probable cause hearing) or that such an opportunity should not be deemed to be one for cross-
examination. 
 169. I have elaborated on the reasons for adopting this procedure. See Friedman, supra note 
78, at 892–98. 
 170. I will not attempt here to set out a detailed algorithm for how a court should arrive at 
results. I still adhere, though, to most of the views set forth in a previous article, Game-
Theoretic. See Friedman, supra note 76. 
 171. For example, when the party opponent is not an accused, perhaps a somewhat 
narrower conception of what is “testimonial” should apply. And perhaps the exclusionary rule 
should not be quite as categorical as when the opponent is the accused. Thus, courts should 
probably be willing in certain cases to allow witnesses to testify from remote locations by 
electronic means, even though the party opponent is not present in the same room.  Cf. Order of 
the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.) (stating, with reference to 
the Confrontation Clause: “Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual 
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.”).  Perhaps also limited 
and well-defined categories of testimonial statements—such as certifications of the authenticity 
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Is the evidence more prejudicial than probative? If the answer to 
this question is affirmative, then ordinarily the hearsay should simply be 
inadmissible.172 If, however, the answer is negative and the statement is 
nontestimonial, that should create a presumption in favor of 
admissibility. And, as I have indicated above, if live testimony of the 
declarant to a given proposition would be more probative than 
prejudicial, then usually the hearsay statement will be as well. 
Is the proponent substantially better able than the opponent to 
produce the declarant? If the answer is negative, then that will weigh 
heavily in favor of admission. If the answer is affirmative, the court 
might consider whether it should give the opponent the option of 
demanding that the proponent produce the declarant, at the opponent’s 
expense, as a condition of introducing the evidence. Or, if the 
proponent’s advantage is only an informational one—for example, he 
knows the identity and location of the declarant—the court might 
consider making admissibility of the statement contingent on the 
proponent’s passing that information along to the opponent. 
Has the proponent given substantial notice of intent to offer the 
hearsay? The importance of notice, I believe, is not to prevent surprise 
but rather to give the opponent an opportunity, if he so chooses, to 
produce the declarant as a live witness. I am not suggesting that there be 
an absolute notice rule; in some cases, it may be apparent that, even 
given ample notice, the opponent would have no interest in producing 
the declarant. But in some cases, delay of notice ought to shift the 
burden, or at least the cost, of producing the declarant to the proponent.  
My main reason for offering this brief sketch of how hearsay law 
may be shaped in the future is to make a more general point: Unlike 
Professor Trachtenberg, I believe the confrontation principle—the basic 
concept that a witness should testify face-to-face with the adverse party 
and be subject to cross-examination—has a central place in our 
adjudicative system.  This principle not only explains the Confrontation 
Clause but lies at the heart of what is worth preserving in the rule 
against hearsay. Once the principle is separately articulated and 
protected, the complex oddities of hearsay law become disposable. We 
need not worry about doctrinal boundaries of the type that Professor 
Trachtenberg defends, between conspiracies and lawful joint ventures.  
We can instead deal with nontestimonial hearsay in a flexible, 
pragmatic manner, in the way that most evidentiary decisions are made. 
We can join almost all the rest of the world in doing so without a 
dogmatic structure of hearsay law, and yet remain faithful to our 
fundamental principles governing how witnesses testify. 
                                                                                                                     
of documents—ought to be admissible, on grounds of efficiency, even without any opportunity 
for cross-examination. 
 172. One can imagine a situation, though, in which the opponent is better able than the 
proponent to produce the declarant, and admission of the hearsay would induce the opponent to 
produce the declarant as a live witness. See Friedman, supra note 78, at 899. 
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